

# **SIDC OPSCOM Report**

## **Cancellation of the Intraday Auction IDA2 for Delivery Date 22/04/2026**

21.04.2026

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# 1. SIDC Intraday Auctions

Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) operates a single EU-wide cross-zonal intraday electricity market, complemented by three Intraday Auctions (IDAs) that enhance efficiency and provide accurate price signals for scarce cross-border capacity. The map below shows the European countries participating in IDAs.



For more information, please visit the [ENTSO-E](#) and [NEMO Committee](#) websites.

## 1.1 Normal Process and Timings

Intraday Auctions occur several times per day, each with a predefined Order Book Gate Closure Time (OBK GCT). Twenty minutes before this closure, cross-zonal capacity allocation through

Intraday Continuous Trading (IDCT) is suspended. This pause allows TSOs to update capacities based on the latest calculations and provide the necessary Cross-Zonal Capacities and Allocation Constraints for the auction.


At OBK GCT, NEMOs exchange these capacities and constraints across their systems and begin transferring Order Books to the central NEMO systems operating the Intraday Auction. Once all Order Books are received, the coupling process starts, taking into account the provided capacities and constraints.

After the auction results are generated, NEMOs validate them and make them available to TSOs via the SIDC Capacity Management Module for verification and allocation of Cross-Zonal Capacity on relevant bidding zone borders.

Once this window closes, cross-border continuous trading automatically reopens, and any possible incomplete Intraday Auction process is automatically cancelled. This report explores the circumstances and implications of such cancellations.


## MCSC Daily Timeline

### SDAC – SIDC – IDA daily timeline



## SIDC/IDA Timeline – Coupling Timing 15:00 / 22:00 / 10:00 CE(S)T

### IDA timeline



<b>IDA 1</b>	<b>14:40</b>	<b>14:45</b>	<b>15:00</b>	<b>15:20</b>
<b>IDA 2</b>	<b>21:40</b>	<b>21:45</b>	<b>22:00</b>	<b>22:20</b>
<b>IDA 3</b>	<b>09:40</b>	<b>09:45</b>	<b>10:00</b>	<b>10:20</b>

## 1.2 Incident Management Process

An incident is defined as an unwanted event occurring within the SIDC IDA systems, the local NEMO or TSO systems connected to SIDC IDA, or the communication channels linking them. An incident that requires convening an Incident Committee (IC) call has the following characteristics: the issue(s) cannot be resolved through a (Local) Backup procedure and may result in breaching a SIDC deadline.

Operational parties have agreed to follow the incident management procedure for handling such incidents. This procedure assumes that communication with relevant third parties (e.g., CCP, Shipping Agent, Explicit Participants) is managed by the involved TSOs and NEMOs according to their local processes.

As a general principle, the Incident Management procedure defines how incidents are addressed. This includes the operation of the Incident Committee (IC) and the application of measures such as closing and reopening interconnectors, restarting markets or delivery areas, suspending trading services, executing corresponding local procedures, and exchanging files in backup mode.

When an incident impacts any Single Intraday Market Coupling process, an Incident Committee (IC) must be convened by the IC SPOC or the IDA Coordinator. Participants in the IC identify the issue(s), assess the situation, and agree on potential solutions. The IC SPOC or IDA

Coordinator records all relevant information, including incident details, discussions, and decisions made during the IC call.

At the start of the IC call, the IC SPOC, the incident reporter, or the IDA Coordinator presents the issue. The parties review actions already taken by the affected party and agree on immediate measures. They also ensure correct classification of the incident, particularly for XBID-related cases.

The IC discusses potential solutions, including recommendations from the service provider where necessary. Once a solution is agreed upon, the parties decide on its implementation. The IC also determines the appropriate communication to market participants.

Typically, within two hours after the IC call concludes, the IC SPOC or IDA Coordinator prepares and finalizes the IC report and shares it with all NEMOs and TSOs. The involved parties review and update the report as needed. For IDCT issues affecting IDAs, the IC SPOC prepares the report; for IDA issues affecting IDCT, the IDA Coordinator is responsible.

## 2. Incident Description

This report informs stakeholders of an incident affecting the Intraday Auction 2 on 21 April 2026, resulting in an IDA cancellation in Advance. The incident occurred due to a failure in the IDA Central Interface Point (CIP) connection, resulting from an issue in the external network infrastructure that led to the disconnection. Given the time constraints, it was determined that the issue could not be resolved during the session. Consequently, the relevant operational processes were terminated, and the IDA session was subsequently canceled in accordance with established procedures.

### 2.1 Course of Events

At approximately 20:30, one NEMO contacted the IDA NEMO Coordinator to inform that IDA CIP was unavailable to them, the IDA NEMO Coordinator confirmed that their IDA CIP was also down and contacted the service provider. Given that the IDA CIP is a critical component for the execution of the Intraday Auctions (IDAs), an Incident Committee was convened shortly thereafter.

### 2.2 Timeline

Event	Start	End
<b>Incident occurrence.</b>	21/04/2026; 20:30	21/04/2026; 22:00
<b>IDA CIP was unavailable.</b>	21/04/2026; 20:30	21/04/2026; 22:00
<b>The IC call started.</b>	21/04/2026; 21:00	21/04/2026; 22:00
<b>The IC was trying to identify root cause.</b>	21/04/2026; 21:00	21/04/2026; 22:00
<b>Following assessment, the IC participants and the CIP service provider determined that the service restoration could not be achieved within</b>	21/04/2026; 21:30	21/04/2026; 22:00

<b>the remaining operational window.</b>		
<b>Post coupling operator confirmed that the session was cancelled in CMM and the IDA session was declared cancelled in advance and the session was aborted in PMB.</b>	21/04/2026; 21:35	21/04/2026; 22:00
<b>Discussion about the underlying issue continued. The Incident Committee agreed about a way forward and a ticket was created.</b>	21/04/2026; 21:35	21/04/2026; 22:00
<b>The IC call ended.</b>	21/04/2026; 22:00	

## 2.3 Incident Cause

The service interruption resulted from third-party malfunctions affecting both the primary and backup communication paths. Although the backup path recovered automatically, the primary path did not restore as expected due to a combination of network infrastructure failures and a configuration deficiency that prevented the automatic resiliency mechanisms from operating correctly.

Initial investigation identified a fault within the third-party communication provider's network and remediation activities were undertaken; however, connectivity was not fully restored. Subsequent analysis revealed an additional issue within the communication path. The investigation also identified limited monitoring visibility and the absence of effective early-warning alerts, which contributed to extended troubleshooting activities. During mitigation efforts, an unintended restart of the communication channel further prolonged recovery.

Following completion of the necessary corrective actions and manual intervention to restore the preferred network path, full connectivity on the primary link was successfully restored.

## 2.4 Impacted NEMOs, Bidding Zones and Bidding Zone Borders

### **Impacted NEMOs:**

EMCO (Nord Pool), EPEX, HEnEx, OMIE, OPCOM, GME, OTE, TGE.

### **Impacted Bidding Zones:**

All.

### **Impacted Bidding Zone Borders:**

All.

### 3. Mitigation Measures And Lessons Learnt

To ensure successful restoration of the operations and prevent the issue from happening again, the following measures have been taken:

**Short-term Solution by Affected Party** As a short-term follow-up measure, enhanced monitoring has been implemented to improve the visibility of possible affected communication paths and support earlier detection of similar issues.

<p><b>Long-term Measures by Affected Party</b></p>	<p>Given the nature of the identified root cause, no long-term corrective measures have been identified. Existing controls are considered adequate, and the situation will continue to be monitored as part of normal operations.</p>
<p><b>SIDC Project Lessons Learned</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▶ Assess opportunities to further enhance the resilience of the IDA CIP setup, including the feasibility of introducing additional backup arrangements or contingency procedures to reduce dependency on a single communication path.</li> <li>▶ Review and strengthen the current incident detection, escalation, and communication processes for CIP-related connectivity issues. This includes evaluating proactive monitoring capabilities, defining clear notification and escalation procedures among involved parties, and considering complementary communication channels to support timely awareness and resolution of operational incidents.</li> </ul>